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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The National Black Law Students Association
(“NBLSA”) submits this brief as amicus curiae in
support of Petitioner. NBLSA is a membership
organization formed in 1968 to promote the
educational, professional, political, and social
objectives of Black law students. Today, NBLSA is
the largest student-run organization in the United
States, with nearly 6,000 members, over 200
chapters in our nation’s law schools, and six
international chapters or affiliates. NBLSA
maintains an interest in the development of
jurisprudence
which
guards
against
racial
discrimination and promotes a positive legal
framework for addressing matters of civil and
constitutional rights. Accordingly, NBLSA has a
substantial interest in the outcome of this litigation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On July 14, 2016, President Barack Obama,
speaking at a town hall on race relations,
acknowledged “what is true for me is true for a lot of
African-American men—is there’s a greater
presumption of dangerousness that arises from the
social and cultural perceptions that have been fed to
folks for a long time . . . And I think it is not as bad
as it used to be, but it's still there, and there's a

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
1

2
history to that.”2 In phrasing the notion of Black
dangerousness in such personal terms, President
Obama undoubtedly did not mean to suggest that
most ordinary Americans regard him as dangerous
and prone to criminality. The vast majority of
Americans no more look upon President Obama as
inherently dangerous than they would the Black
physician who treats them in the emergency room,
the Black firefighter who responds to a call at their
home, the Black teacher who speaks with them at a
parent-teacher conference, or the Black attorney who
appears before them at the bench. But faced with an
unfamiliar
stranger,
placed
in
stressful
circumstances, presented with a criminal defendant,
even well-meaning people fall prey to the stereotype
that, whether for reason of biology or culture, Black
people are inherently violent and dangerous.
This narrative of dangerousness reaches back
to slavery when Black people were believed to be not
just inferior, but also savage brutes prone to violence
and criminality unless domesticated and made
docile. Conceived as a popular philosophy, the
narrative evolved into a respected scientific doctrine,
positing that the very physical attributes of Black
people—from the darkness of their skin, to the
broadness of their nose, to the coarseness of their
hair—were biological manifestations of a lesserevolved human form. When the Civil War ended,
conventional wisdom held that freedom made
evident in Blacks what slavery had kept hidden by
ABC News, President Obama and the People Town Hall: A
National
Conversation,
YOUTUBE
(July
15,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNZvIgA0DIc (remarks at
41:58).
2

3
giving “loose reins to the animal.”3 During
Reconstruction and through Jim Crow, as Black
Codes in the South and discriminatory policing in
the North literally criminalized Blackness, sociology
and statistics replaced Darwinism and eugenics in
arguing for innate Black criminality. In the socalled progressive era, well-meaning reformers
advocated for more humane treatment of criminals
but still warned that the Black criminal was a breed
apart because the propensity for crime revealed the
faults of an immature race.
The narrative of Black criminality is not some
vestigial relic of a long dead past. The most rigorous
cognitive and psychological scientific research of the
last sixty years has shown that even in our own
enlightened modern times, vast segments of society
hold the belief that Blacks and Whites occupy
different moral universes, that Blacks are more
prone to criminality than Whites, and that the most
salient aspects of Black character are “laziness,
murderous violence, and sexual intemperance.”4 As
recently as June 2016, a Reuters/Ipsos public opinion
poll revealed that a shockingly high number of
people of all political stripes described Blacks as
unintelligent, lazy, violent, and criminal.5
Eugene R. Corson, The Future of the Colored Race in the
United States from an Ethnic and Medical Standpoint, 15 N.Y.
MED. TIMES 193, 201 (1877); EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE
AFRICAN
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIENCE:
A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 149–50 (Robert P. Green, Jr. 2000).
4 ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN
THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 41 (2010).
5 Emily Flitter & Chris Kahn, Exclusive: Trump Supporters
More Likely to View Blacks Negatively, REUTERS (June 28,
2016, 8:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionrace-idUSKCN0ZE2SW.
3
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So, when an expert witness told the jury that
Mr. Buck was dangerous because he is Black, he
dredged up into the open for all members of the jury
to see the monstrous specter that is never far from
the surface: the violent Black brute, the single most
fearful, dehumanizing, and cruel stereotype Black
people have had to endure. In so doing, he did not
just make a passing reference to race; he made race
the central question for determining whether Mr.
Buck should be put to death. This is constitutionally
and morally indefensible.
Any procedure that bars review of a death
sentence must give way to the greater constitutional
and moral imperative of ferreting out impermissible
appeals to a defendant’s race. Historically, Black
defendants have been subjected to greater rates of
charging, higher rates of conviction, and longer and
harsher sentences.
This Court has worked
deliberately to correct these disparities, to exorcise
race from our criminal justice system, and to develop
a jurisprudence that fosters justice and equity.
Therefore, this Court should not now let stand a
procedural bar to consideration of a defendant’s
claim that race was a factor in a jury’s death
sentence.
ARGUMENT

5
I. THERE IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN OUR HISTORY,
INDELIBLY STAMPED IN OUR PSYCHE, AND
STUBBORNLY PRESENT IN OUR CULTURE A
CRUEL AND DEHUMANIZING STEREOTYPE THAT
BLACK PEOPLE ARE UNIQUELY VIOLENT AND
DANGEROUS
A.

The Ideology of Slavery Held as Its
Fundamental Tenet that Blacks Were
by Their Nature Savage Brutes Prone
to Violence and Criminality Unless
Domesticated and Made Docile by the
Firm Hand of a White Master

Thomas Jefferson believed that “the blacks,
whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct
by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites
in the endowments both of body and mind.”6 Though
he conceded he did not have much evidence to back
up his opinion, he still insisted that “in general their
existence appears to participate more of sensation
than reflection.”7 In Jefferson’s time the racial
prejudice that would eventually lead White
Americans to conclude that “black men were not
really men but cattle,”8 had not yet quite hardened
into an ideology of race that posited that Black
people were biologically a lower life form. However,
in both North and South, among both slaveholders
and abolitionists, the belief that Black people were
an alien and dangerous presence gained wide
currency in early Nineteenth century America.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150
(1832).
7 Id. at 146.
8 JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 168 (1955).
6

6
After Virginia briefly considered but
ultimately rejected legislative proposals that would
have led to emancipation, Professor Thomas R. Dew
of William and Mary College explained that Black
people were unfit for emancipation because they
were “differing from us in color and habits and
vastly inferior in the scale of civilization.”9 Like
Jefferson, Dew concluded that the supposed indolent
and violent nature of Black people resulted from “an
inherent and intrinsic cause.”10 Defending slavery
from abolitionist argument, William Drayton, a
Charleston
lawyer,
argued
that
“personal
observation must convince every candid man that
the negro is constitutionally indolent, voluptuous,
and prone to vice, that his mind is heavy, dull, and
unambitious, that the doom that has made the
African in all ages and countries, a slave—is the
natural consequence of the inferiority of his
character.”11
Even Northern abolitionists were not
altogether free of the idea of Black criminality. A
group of New Jersey abolitionists cautioned that free
Blacks “were given to idleness, frolicking,
drunkenness, and in some few cases dishonesty.”12
A Philadelphia abolitionist “described most

GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE
MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND
DESTINY, 1817–1914 45 (1987)
10 Thomas R. Dew, Professor Dew on Slavery, in THE PROSLAVERY ARGUMENT 287, 429 (1853).
11 WILLIAM DRAYTON, THE SOUTH VINDICATED FROM THE
TREASON AND FANATICISM OF THE NORTHERN ABOLITIONISTS 232
(1836).
12 TALI MENDELBERG, RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY,
IMPLICIT MESSAGES AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 32 (2001).
9

7
Philadelphia negroes as degraded and vicious.”13 A
New York abolitionist society bemoaned “the
looseness of manners and depravity of conduct in
many of the persons of Colour in this city.”14
Alarmed by what it perceived as the “depravity of
the negro,” and concerned about Blacks becoming
“both injurious and burdensome,” the Massachusetts
legislature appointed a committee to study
restricting Black immigration to the state.15
The doctrine of inherent Black inferiority first
began as a popular emotional justification for
slavery. However, it soon became “the basis of a
world view, an explicit ideology around which the
beneficiaries of white supremacy could organize
themselves and their thoughts.”16 Central to this
worldview was the notion that Black people were not
just inferior, but also and more importantly that
they were by their very nature savage brutes prone
to violence and criminality unless “domesticated”
and made docile in slavery. Thus, in order to
reconcile the notion of Blacks as “naturally
mendacious …and thievish”17 with the Southern
claim of slaves as “contented, peaceful and
harmless,”18 proslavery propagandists conjured up
the concept of the duality of negro character:
According to this theory, the Negro was
by nature a savage brute.
Under
FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 4.
ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 223–24 (1967).
15 Id. at 225.
16 FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 47.
17 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 17 (1853).
18 FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 52.
13
14

8
slavery, however, he was domesticated
or, to a limited degree, civilized. Hence
docility was not so much his natural
character as an artificial creation of
slavery. As long as the control of the
master was firm and assured, the slave
would be happy, loyal and affectionate;
but remove or weaken the authority of
the master, and he would revert to type
as bloodthirsty savage.19
In the decades preceding the Civil War, the
popular philosophy of the dual Black character
evolved into a respected scientific doctrine. In 1839,
Dr. Samuel George Morton published, CRANIA
AMERICANA, or what he called an empirical study of
racial differences. According to Morton, careful
examination of the size and shapes of different types
of men led to the inevitable conclusion that Blacks
represented an altogether different species.20 Dr.
Josiah Nott, an ethnologist originally from Mobile,
Alabama who would later become the Dean of the
School of Science at Harvard University, firmly
believed that Africa was the homeland of “a
succession of human beings with intellects as dark
as their skins,”21 and “attempted to convince
educated Americans that the Negro was not a blood
brother to the whites.”22 Relying in part on
measurements of skull capacities, facial features,
and even hair textures of Black and White cadavers,
Nott concluded that the anatomical differences
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 74–75.
21 MARLI F. WEINER & MAIZE HOUGH, SEX, SICKNESS AND
SLAVERY: ILLNESS IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 18 (2012).
22 FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 75.
19
20

9
between Whites and Blacks were “greater than the
differences in the skeleton of the Wolf, Dog and
Hyena, which are allowed to be distinct species.”23
Though Nott was indisputably a White
racialist committed to the cause of slavery, his views
of Black savagery were made respectable by a veneer
of scientific discourse.
Thus, in 1851, John
Campbell, a prominent scholar, was able to use
Nott’s work to publish a remarkable volume titled
Negro-Mania, in which he summarized the scientific
consensus on Black savagery:
We every where find proofs of . . .
inflexible cruelty, selfishness and
disposition to cheat, a want of all
sympathetic impulses and feelings, the
most brutal apathy and indolence,
unless roused by the pressure of
physical want, or stimulated by the
desire of revenge and the thirst of
blood.24
B.

In the Post Civil War Era, Scientists
Maintained that No Greater Menace
Faced the Nation than the Threat
Posed by the “Load of African Negro
Blood”

The Civil War brought former slaves
“suddenly, violently …in a new birthright, at a time
JOSIAH NOTT, TWO LECTURES ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
THE CAUCASIAN AND NEGRO RACES 25 (1844).
24 JOHN CAMPBELL, NEGRO-MANIA: BEING AN EXAMINATION OF
THE FALSELY ASSUMED EQUALITY OF THE VARIOUS RACES OF
MEN 137 (1851).
23

10
of war and passion, in the midst of the stricken,
embittered population of their former masters.”25
Post-bellum scientists took stock of these new
birthright citizens and concluded that “during
slavery . . . so far as the merely physical man was
concerned they were better off . . . But since the war
and emancipation things have reversed; freedom
gave loose reins to the animal.”26 Chief among
scientists warning about Black criminality was Nott.
In an influential article titled “The Negro Problem,”
he explained that Blacks were “bred first in a
savagery that had never been broken by the least
efforts towards a higher state.”27 He insisted that
“judged by the light of all experience, these people
are a danger to America greater and more
insuperable than any of those that menace the other
great civilized states of the world,” and that no
challenge facing the country was as great as
“compared to this load of African negro blood that an
evil past has imposed upon us.”28
While Nott harbored no doubt about the
inherent criminality of Black people, he cautioned
that more research was needed to fully understand
its origins.
The American ethnographers,
anthropologists,
physicians,
penologists
and
statisticians who took up the call for more research
almost uniformly concluded, as did Henry Martin
Boies, a leading penologist, that Blacks were prone
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(Mar.
1901)
at
354,
357,
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm.
26 Corson, supra note 3, at 196.
27 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON ET AL., THE NEGRO PROBLEM 697
(1903).
28 Id. at 699.
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to criminality because they had “strong animalism
by nature and cultivation,” which resulted in a lack
of “virtue and little moral restraint.”29
Greatly influenced by social Darwinism,
eugenics and other European theories of hereditary
criminality, post-bellum social scientists “largely
understood criminals as falling into one of two
categories: occasional and habitual. Most crime
stemmed from poverty, poor environment, and poor
moral training, typical motivating factors for
occasional criminality. Habitual criminals, however,
were biologically deficient and morally bankrupt
individuals.”30
To these scientists, “habitual
criminals possessed common atavistic traits—
physical and mental characteristics that otherwise
distinguished them from normal human beings.”
Superimposed upon what Charles Sumner called the
“oligarchy of the skin,”31 eugenist theories of
criminality as being hereditary effectively equated
Black skin with criminal traits. As such, Americans
“envisioned civilized White heterosexual society in a
perilous battle not simply to maintain social,
political, and moral authority, but also to preserve
their gene pool and the sanctity of whiteness.”32
Of course, the tragic irony is that many of
these scientists and reformers warning of the
HENRY M. BOIES, PRISONERS AND PAUPERS: A STUDY OF THE
ABNORMAL INCREASE OF CRIMINALS AND THE PUBLIC BURDEN OF
PAUPERISM IN THE UNITED STATES; THE CAUSES AND THE
REMEDIES 73 (1893).
30 KALI N. GROSS, COLORED AMAZONS: CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND
BLACK WOMEN IN THE CITY OF BROTHERLY LOVE, 1880–1910 133
(1st ed. 2006).
31 CHARLES SUMNER, VOL. 14: HIS COMPLETE WORKS 292 (1900).
32 GROSS, supra note 30, at 133.
29
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dangers of Black criminality in the post-bellum era
were able to offer what seemed to be irrefutable data
of a wave of Black crime at the end of the Civil War.
That is because the Black Codes enacted by every
single Southern state had succeeded in essentially
criminalizing Blackness.33 To social scientists
studying crime in America, the innate criminal
nature of Black people rather than Southern Black
Codes and Northern racial discrimination served to
explain the seeming prevalence of crime in the Black
population.
In fact, the notion of Blacks as
inherently criminal gained wide purchase in the
post-bellum years in part because most of the
scientists advancing that theory claimed to be
dispassionate truth seekers free of irrational racial
prejudice.
Thus, in 1896, the same year this Court
validated American racial apartheid in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Frederick Ludwig
Hoffman, a German-born and educated actuary and
statistician from Prudential Insurance Company,
published a study warning that freedom had made
evident an aspect of the Black character that slavery
had managed to keep hidden: a propensity for
criminality.34 Specifically, Hoffman observed that in
slavery it was “well known that neither crime [nor]
pauperism existed.”35 But, using data from the 1890
census, Hoffman showed that, while Blacks were
See W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167
(1962) (noting that although “[n]egroes were no longer real
estate… [n]egroes were liable to a slave trade under the guise
of vagrancy and apprenticeships laws”).
34 See generally FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND
TENDENCIES OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO (1896).
35 Id. at 217.
33
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only 12 percent of the population, they represented
30 percent of all prisoners, 30 percent of those
imprisoned for violent crimes, 41 percent of those
imprisoned for rape, and nearly 50 percent of those
imprisoned for arson.36
While the numbers
appeared, as Hoffman put it, to speak for
themselves, in truth Hoffman’s statistics were part
of a carefully crafted racial narrative all the more
pernicious for seemingly being scientifically neutral.
Hoffman’s own data showed crime statistics for
Blacks were no different than those of immigrants
and poor Whites. But, whereas Hoffman explained
crime among poor White immigrants as a function of
economic deprivation and societal discrimination, he
insisted that crime among Black people was a
function of innate characteristics. Hoffman’s use of
data was revolutionary because he “combined crime
statistics with a well-crafted white supremacist
narrative to shape the reading of black criminality
while trying to minimize the appearance of doing
so.”37 Indeed, by carefully reporting not just crime
statics but also data showing increase in education
among Blacks, Hoffman was able to argue that
beneficial social institutions such as schools and
churches that would normally have civilizing effects
on White criminals had no impact on Blacks. His
words bear reproducing in full:
I have given the statistics of the general
progress of the race in religion and
education for the country at large, and
have shown that in church and school
KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF
BLACKNESS 51 (2011).
37 Id.
36
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the number of attending members or
pupils is constantly increasing; but in
statistics of crime and the data of
illegitimacy the proof is furnished that
neither religion nor education has
influenced to an appreciable degree the
moral progress of the race. Whatever
benefit the individual colored man may
have gained from the extension of
religious worship and educational
processes, the race as a whole has gone
backwards rather than forwards.38
C.

The Progressive Era Exchanged the
Biological Determinism of Black
Individuals Being Innately Violent
with the Cultural Determinism of
Black Communities Being Peculiarly
Tolerant of Criminality

At the turn of the twentieth century, social
scientists and reformers abandoned theories of
biological determinism equating Blackness with
crime. However, in search of an explanation for
what they perceived as a disproportionate share of
criminal behavior by Black people, arguably wellmeaning reformers and supposedly enlightened
scientists exchanged one form of racial determinism
for another: crime was unique to Blacks not by
reason of their biology but by reason of their culture.
That is to say, reformers explained White criminal
behavior as a function of general socio-economic
forces, but described Black criminal behavior as a
function of particular Black culture.
38

Id. at 52.
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For example, Frances Kellor, a White female
criminologist, traveled the South measuring body
sizes and shapes of Black female prisoners to show
that there were no inherent biological differences
between Black and White criminals.39 However,
looking at crime statistics, Kellor nonetheless drew
an essentialist distinction between White and Black
criminals: “The Negroes’ criminality is that of an
undeveloped race…The Negroes’ crime show an
absence of social and personal responsibility, and are
an outgrowth of impulse rather than of well-laid
plans and complicated schemings.”40 Frederic
Bushee, a leading Boston reformer and author of
immigrant life, noted the high crime rate in Irish
and Italian communities. He also remarked that
they brought “many valuable traits to the American
people,” and that “it is fortunate that they possess
the characteristics which make them easily
assimilable.”41 However, whereas rampant crime in
immigrant communities did not prevent reformers
like Bushee from understanding the nurturing of
immigrants as key to the nation’s health, they
remained adamant that culturally, Blacks were
different: “The Negroes in general reveals the faults
of an immature race” and that, unlike immigrants,
assimilation into American society was “not
desirable.”42
As always, W.E.B. Du Bois put it best:
Id. at 88.
FRANCES KELLOR, EXPERIMENTAL SOCIOLOGY: DESCRIPTIVE
AND ANALYTICAL: DELINQUENTS 31 (2010).
41 FREDERICK A. BUSHEE, ETHNIC FACTORS IN THE POPULATION
OF BOSTON 158 (1903).
42 Id. at 115, 160.
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40

16
Murder may swagger, theft may rule
and prostitution flourish, and the
nation
gives
but
a
spasmodic,
intermittent and lukewarm attention.
But let the murderer be black or the
thief brown or the violator of
womanhood have but a drop of Negro
blood, and the righteousness of the
indignation sweeps the world.
Nor
would this fact make the indignation
less justifiable did not we all know that
it was blackness that was condemned,
and not the crime.43
D.

In the Modern Era, Subtle Skin-Color
Coding of Dangerousness Ushered in
the Rise of Hoodlums and Villains

Between the two world wars and up until the
modern civil rights movement, the naked racial
theories that painted Blacks as black-hearted
villains did not altogether disappear from
mainstream consciousness. Indeed, as the centuries
progressed, the various malignancies associated with
Blackness were conflated into a fearful specter of
death and destruction. The “bad classes of Negroes”
seemed to grow larger each year; their criminal
appetites and deviant sexual desires less easily sated
than ever before.”44 In those years, the narrative of
Black violence acquired explicit sexual overtones, in
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOUL OF WHITE FOLK (1920), reprinted
in W.E.B. DU BOIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: SELECTIONS FROM HIS
WRITINGS 167 (2014).
44 WILLIAM L.VAN DEBURG, HOODLUMS: BLACK VILLAINS AND
SOCIAL BANDITS IN AMERICAN LIFE 149 (2004).
43
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which “two-legged monsters,” consumed by lust and
“rotten” with venereal diseases posed a constant
threat to White women.45
However, with the advent of the civil rights
movement, overt expressions of Black people as
racial villains fell out of fashion, to be replaced with
more coded but no less potent language. To be sure,
some still clung to overt biological claims. Thus, in
reaction to civil disorder and unrest growing out of
civil rights protests, William Parker, then the Chief
of Police for Los Angeles, explained “you cannot
ignore the genes in the behavior pattern of people,”
comparing Black “hoodlums” to monkeys in a zoo.46
But for the most part, descriptions of Black
criminality became more coded and subtle.
Individuals, who after years of discrimination,
finally reacted out of frustration, were typically
described as “lacking respect for authority,”
“hoodlums,” “marauders,” or engaged in “guerilla
warfare.”47
II. THE NARRATIVE OF BLACK DANGEROUSNESS
REMAINS PART OF OUR CULTURAL WORLDVIEW
Historian Barbara Fields tells us that “ideas
about color, like ideas about anything else derive
their importance, indeed their very definition, from
their context.”48 The automatic presumption of Black
LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND:
THE AGE OF JIM CROW 301 (1998).
46 VAN DEBURG, supra note 44, at 41.
45

BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN

Id. at 152–53.
Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in
REGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C.
VANN WOODWARD 143, 146 (1982).
47
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dangerousness is not driven by any sort of
primordial biological impulse, but is a social
construct that has been, in President Obama’s
words, “fed to folks for a long time.” And, the most
rigorous social science of the last sixty years shows
that this social construct, ancient as it may be,
remains part of our cultural worldview.
A.

In a Wide Set of Circumstances
Americans
Strongly
and
Automatically Stereotype Blacks as
Violent Criminals

Social scientists have long confirmed what
most of us instinctively know: we all carry implicit
biases against others who we perceive to be different
from us. In the case of Blacks:
The stereotype of Black Americans as
violent and criminal
has been
documented by social psychologists for
almost 60 years. Researchers have
highlighted
the
robustness
and
frequency of this stereotypic association
by demonstrating its effects on
numerous outcome variables, including
people’s memory of who was holding a
deadly razor in a subway scene, people’s
evaluation of ambiguously aggressive
behavior,
people’s
decisions
to
categorize weapons as weapons, the
speed at which people decide to shoot
someone holding a weapon, and the
probability that they will shoot at all.
Not only is the association between
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Blacks and crime strong, it also appears
to be automatic.”49
The Implicit Aptitude Test (“IAT”) is the most
rigorous study on implicit racial bias and tests
automatic associations by individuals. The most
widely known IAT pairs faces of Black or White men
with “good” or “bad” words. Without fail, the test
shows that the majority of takers are slower to
associate Black faces with “good” words. The most
notable and extreme unconscious biases that social
scientists have discovered are enduring stereotypes
of Black people as dangerous, less-than-human
criminals. Even when people are supposedly
unaware of historical stereotypes associated with
Black people, they associate Blacks with qualities
that fit these historical biases. Thus, an IAT using
Black and White faces and pictures of apes and nonape animals showed that individuals associate Black
people with apes even though the majority of
participants indicated that they had never heard of
the Blacks as apes stereotype.50
But social science research has gone beyond
just unconscious associations. Cognitive scientists
and psychologists have used selective-attention
studies to demonstrate that people feel more
threatened by Black people than White people.51 The
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and
Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876
(2004).
50 Philip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge,
Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences,
94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 292–306 (2008).
51 Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based
Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXP’L PSYCHOL. 1322,
1322–27 (2008).
49
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theory of selective attention is that people pay more
attention to things that are perceived as
threatening. It originally applied to proven threats
like spiders and snakes, but studies have discovered
that Black men are also viewed as threats. For
example, in one study participants found a dot on a
screen more quickly if it appeared where there had
previously been a Black face than if it appeared
where there had been a White face, demonstrating
selective attention.52 Another study found that
people were more likely to misperceive an object as a
weapon when held by a Black person than when held
by a White person and are also more likely to shoot
an unarmed Black person than an unarmed White
person.53 When people are primed with a Black
face—meaning it flashes in front of them and they do
not even realize they have seen it—they are faster to
identify a gun and more likely to mischaracterize a
tool as a weapon, whereas when people are primed
with a White face, they are faster to identify a tool.54
In 2004, scientists from Yale University,
Stanford University, the Pennsylvania State
University, and the University of California, Los
Angeles collaborated on a groundbreaking paper,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing.
The paper’s findings are striking: “When officers
were given no information other than a face and
when they were explicitly directed to make
Id.
Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and the
Decision to Shoot: the Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive
Control, 42 J. EXP’L PSYCHOL. 120, 120–28 (2006).
54 B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of
Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon,
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181–92 (2001).
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judgments of criminality, race played a significant
role in how those judgments were made. Black faces
looked more criminal to police officers; the more
Black, the more criminal.”55 Their findings also
showed that stereotyping Blacks as inherently
dangerous has a perverse looping effect, in which
Blackness not only triggers association with
criminality but also magnifies it; when shown a
Black face, people who associate Blackness with
criminality misremember the Black face as even
more stereotypically Black.
In eerily prescient language, the scientists
concluded that one inescapable implication of their
findings is that:
Police officers may face elevated levels of
danger in the presence of White armed
suspects in comparison with Black armed
suspects. For example, if police officers have a
delayed response to White suspects with guns
or knives these officers may be more likely to
get hurt, shot, or killed when confronting
White armed suspects in comparison with
Black suspects.
In contrast, unarmed,
innocent Blacks may easily become targets of
intense visual surveillance by both police
officers and the lay public. With their eyes,
perceivers may tie individual Black targets to
a group-based suspicion—and sadly, Black
people who appear stereotypically Black may
be the most likely of all to feel the tug.56
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B.

The
Stereotype
of
Black
Dangerousness
Is
Constantly
Reflected in and Reinforced by
Popular Media

Nowhere is the stereotype of Black
dangerousness more prevalent than in modern
popular media. Today, the most common negative
stereotypes of Black people are “impressions of
laziness,
murderous
violence,
and
sexual
57
intemperance.”
In that way, all manners of
national debates about race—from parenting to
education to housing—are driven by and even
resolved with this idea of the excessive criminality of
Black people.
When Richard Sherman, a Black professional
football player, gave an interview in which he
asserted that he was the best at his position, he
sparked extensive attention from news programs
and on social media. Sherman, who graduated with a
3.9 GPA from Stanford University, was called
“classless,” a “monkey,” a “thug,” and “ghetto,”
among other racial epithets on social media. Indeed,
the word “thug” was used 629 times the day after the
interview.58 Author Ta-Nehisi Coates opined that
onlookers, incapable of seeing Sherman as an

Entman & Rojecki, supra note 4, at 41.
Kyle Wagner, The Word “Thug” Was Uttered 625 Times on
TV on Monday. That’s a Lot, DEADSPIN, REGRESSING (Jan. 21,
2014),
http://regressing.deadspin.com/the-word-thug-wasuttered-625-times-on-tv-yesterday-1506098319.
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individual, “instead [saw] the sum of all American
fears—monkey, thug, terrorist, nigger.”59
Political scientist Tali Mendelberg explains
that in the post-civil rights era, explicit race-based
appeals that violate norms of equality have been
replaced by more subtle visual imagery and coded
language that tap into persistent racial prejudices
and fears.60
The racially charged word “thug”
functions much in this manner. A contemporary
incarnation of the “Black brute” and “Negro savage”
archetypes, it connotes violence and brutishness. In
2011, for example, the New York Post compared
tennis player Serena Williams to a “street thug,”
after she yelled at a chair umpire during the U.S.
Open.61 Michelle Bachman, Rush Limbaugh, Karl
Rove, and many others frequently label President
Obama “thuggish” and a “Chicago thug.”62
The word has been used, too, in the media
coverage around the recent shooting deaths of young
Black men.
For instance, when George
Zimmerman’s defense team released photographs of
17-year-old Trayvon Martin showing off gold teeth,
the Washington Post noted how the tactic fed
Ta-Nehisi Coates, Richard Sherman’s Best Behavior, THE
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
20,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/01/rich
ard-shermans-best-behavior/283198/
60 MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 6.
61 Phil Mushnick, Classless Serena Celebrated, N.Y. POST (Sept.
16,
2011),
http://nypost.com/2011/09/16/classless-serenacelebrated/.
62 Cindy Boren, Richard Sherman, Frustrated by Reaction,
Equates ‘Thug’ with Racial Slur, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2014/01/23/richard-sherman-frustrated-by-reactionequates-thug-with-racial-slur/.
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directly into the narrative “painting Trayvon Martin
as a thug who deserved to die.”63
The narrative that Blacks are inherently
criminal
is
emphasized
further
by
the
overrepresentation of Blacks in crime reporting.64
One study, which tracked the 2014 news coverage of
every major New York network affiliate, found that
while 51 percent of the people arrested by the NYPD
for violent crime are Black, in evening news coverage
Blacks were represented as the suspects 75 percent
of the time. This narrative also controls what kinds
of stories are told about Black people and Black
culture. The New York Times recently analyzed the
roles that have earned Black actors Academy
Awards nominations, revealing how violence and
criminalization figure prominently in depictions of
Black life. Since the first awards show in 1929,
Black men have been nominated twenty times.
Thirteen of those performances involved being
arrested or incarcerated and fifteen involved violent
or criminal behavior.65
The effect of this relentless narrative is
significant. A national survey conducted in 2010
Jonathan Capehart, Pictures Put Trayvon Martin on Trial,
WASH.
POST
(May
28,
2013).
,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/wp/2013/05/28/pictures-put-trayvon-martin-on-trial/
64 Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Overrepresentation and
Underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos as
Lawbreakers on Television News, 50 J. COMM. 131, 131–54
(2000).
65 Brandon K. Thorp, What Does the Academy Value in a Black
Performance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
19,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
02/21/movies/what-does-theacademy-value-in-a-black-performance.html.
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asked White respondents to estimate the percentage
of burglaries, illegal drug sales, and juvenile crime
committed by Blacks. The researchers found that
the respondents overestimated actual Black
participation in these crimes—measured by
arrests—by approximately 20 to 30 percent.66
When a narrative is so widely circulated, it
comes to bear on every aspect of life. For instance, a
2015 study found that starting at age ten, Blacks
were viewed as less innocent than other children.
Researchers showed a group of female K-12 teachers
identical school records of a fictitious middle school
student who had misbehaved.
Some teachers
received the records labeled with a stereotypically
Black name, while others reviewed records labeled
with a stereotypically White name. When asked how
they would respond to the infractions, teachers were
more likely to escalate the response when the
student was believed to be Black. The study also
found that when a student was believed to be Black,
teachers were more likely to attribute the behavior
to a larger pattern, rate the incidents as more
troubling and warranting of discipline, and were
more likely to predict future suspensions.67
Research also shows that the presence of
Blacks in a neighborhood correlates to the level of
perceived crime in that neighborhood. A 2001 study
Justin T. Pickett, Reconsidering the Relationship Between
Perceived Neighborhood Racial Composition and Whites’
Perceptions of Victimization Risk: Do Racial Stereotypes
Matter?,
50 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 155–56, 160 (2012).
67 Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Race and the
Disciplining of Young Students, 26 J. PSYCHOL. SCI. 617 (2015).
66

26
of residential surveys and police data from Seattle,
Chicago, and Baltimore found a positive association
between how residents perceived the level of crime
in their neighborhood and the percentage of young
Black men living in that neighborhood, even when
controlling for a variety of neighborhood
characteristics.68 A 2004 study by researchers from
Harvard and the University of Michigan found that
as the concentration of minority groups in a
neighborhood increases, residents of all races
perceive more “disorder,” even after accounting for
personal characteristics of the respondents and
neighborhood conditions.69
The idea of Black criminality has become so
ingrained in the national consciousness that it is
encapsulated in a single racially coded phrase:
Black-on-Black crime. This absurd phrase, which is
rarely explained but often repeated even by
supposedly well-meaning people, is meant to
somehow convey the idea that Blacks are so violent
that they even kill “their own kind.” The truth is
Black intra-racial crime is neither unique nor
unnatural. The vast majority of violent crimes are
intra rather than interracial, and this is particularly
true in a society that remains as racially segregated
as ours. Yet, the fact that in ordinary discourse the
idea of White on White crime never seems to register
as a real phenomenon perhaps only goes to show

Lincoln Quillian & Devan Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher
Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of
Neighborhood Crime 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 717–67 (2001).
69 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen B. Raudenbush, Seeing
Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of
‘Broken Windows’, 67 SOC. PYSCHOL. Q. 319, 319–42 (2004).
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how we have so thoroughly made Blacks villains and
villains Black.
III. THIS COURT HAS LONG WORKED TO FERRET
OUT THE USE OF RACE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
In light of the history and nature of stereotype
catalogued above, the injection of Mr. Buck’s race
into his sentencing proceeding is extraordinary
because for so long this Court has endeavored to
remove race from the calculus of guilt and
punishment.
Jurisprudential
development
in
criminal procedure reflects this Court’s profound
understanding that racism infects our institutions
and must be stamped out wherever possible.
A.

Race Can Never Be Allowed to Factor
into the Calculus of Guilt or
Punishment

Perhaps the central purpose of our criminal
law is the regulation of undesirable behavior. By
defining behavior that is undesirable, and by
prescribing appropriate punishment for that
behavior, criminal law not only achieves retribution
but also deters defendants and others from engaging
in such behavior in the future. The process of
criminal law, then, involves determining whether a
defendant engaged in proscribed conduct and
affording appropriate punishment. A person’s race is
irrelevant in both matters; allowing race to be
considered either in determining guilt or in
proscribing punishment is arbitrary and pernicious.
Indeed, allowing race to infect criminal law
undermines the credibility and integrity of the
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criminal justice system. But more than that,
allowing race to influence a finding of guilt or a
determination of punishment is morally repugnant.
This Court has long endeavored to protect the
integrity and fairness of our legal system against the
effects of the arbitrary consideration of race,
commanding that courts engage in “unceasing efforts
to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal
justice system” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
310 (1987) (internal citation omitted), because
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all
aspects,
is
especially
pernicious
in
the
administration of justice,” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 555 (1979). For example, this Court has
repeatedly insisted that exclusion of an otherwise
qualified person from serving on a jury on account of
race violates due process. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
secures . . . an impartial jury . . . selected or chosen
without discrimination against such jurors because
of their color”); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 309–10 (1879) (“That colored people are singled
out and expressly denied by a statute all right to
participate...as jurors...is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race...equal justice.”). See also Foster v.
Chatman, 578 U. S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 737 (2016) (“The
Constitution forbids striking even a single
prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose”);
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950); Norris v. Alabama, 294
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U.S. 587 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319
(1906); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
Similarly, this Court has held that selective
prosecution on the basis of race violates due process.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978);
Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). Notwithstanding
this Court’s commitment to ferreting out selective
prosecution on the basis of race, this practice
continues to infect our criminal justice system, and
lower federal and state courts continue to confront it.
In one illustrative case, a Black defendant
challenged his prosecution on the ground it was
racially motivated. United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d
969 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendant pointed to the
fact that police officers made custom t-shirts
celebrating his arrest and that of his wife, who was
also Black, while deliberately leaving out a White
codefendant, and then sent a postcard of a Black
woman with bananas on her head to the defendant
in jail. Id. at 975. The Sixth Circuit found that the
“undeniably shameful” conduct of the officers “was
not only outrageous and unprofessional, but also
racially motivated.” Id. at 977.
Analogously, prosecution for crack cocaine
possession or sale has played out along racial lines.
See, e.g., United States v. Tuitt, 68 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.
Mass. 1999) (not a single White defendant
prosecuted in federal court for crack cocaine charges
for an entire calendar year in a region that
encompassed four counties; only Black and Latino
defendants were prosecuted). As this Court has
recognized, just like racial discrimination in the jury
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selection process and in the decision whether to
prosecute, the arbitrary and invidious use of race at
any point in a criminal proceeding is fundamentally
unfair and undermines any verdict, judgment or
sentence.
B.

Overt and Subtle Racial Appeals
Unjustly Taint Criminal Proceedings

Just as allowing race to infect the
determination of guilt or punishment undermines
the integrity and fairness of our criminal justice
system, so, too, do overt and subtle appeals to racial
bias. Whether by a judge, a prosecutor, or defense
counsel, an appeal to a jury based on racial prejudice
poisons our system of justice.
Racial appeals
undermine principles of fairness and equity, and
bear no rational relationship to one’s guilt or to the
proper
determination
of
punishment.
Notwithstanding the progress from three-fifths of a
person to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the passage of time and the
evolution of precedent, “racial and other forms of
discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the
administration of justice as in our society as a whole.
Perhaps today that discrimination takes a form more
subtle than before. But it is not less real or
pernicious.” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558–59
(1979). Though overt racial appeals are less frequent
today, innuendo and insinuation are often used to
arouse racial prejudice. Barring review of such
invidious appeals subverts the integrity of the
criminal justice system. Instead of ensuring fairness,
procedural rules that bar review of claims of
improper racial appeals secure injustice.
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Today, too many prosecutors improperly play
to jurors’ racial biases. A prosecutor may allude to a
defendant’s race in connection with a propensity for
violence by describing that defendant in animalistic
terms, degrading his or her humanity. See e.g.,
Bennet v. Stirling, 2016 WL 1070812 (D.S.C. Mar.
16, 2016) (prosecutor compared the Black defendant
to King Kong, describing his victim, a blonde woman,
to allude to her being White). Prosecutors may
reference Black defendants’ relationships with White
women to stir up racial prejudice, and courts rightly
find these insinuations irrelevant, racially charged
and prejudicial. See, e.g., Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d
95, 115 (3d Cir. 2001) (prosecutor referenced Black
defendant's White wife); Bryant v. State, 25 S.W.3d
924, 925–26 (Tex. App. 2000) (prosecutor referenced
Black defendant impregnating “a White girl”);
Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221, 223 (1987)
(prosecutor referenced Black defendant’s irrelevant
“physical relationship” with White woman); United
States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (6th Cir.
1970) (overturning death sentence where prosecutor
asked character witness whether he knew the Black
defendant was “running around with a White go-go
dancer”). These cloaked racial appeals do not bear on
guilt or innocence, and have no relevance to
appropriate punishment; rather these appeals incite
racial animus for the purpose of securing conviction
or a stiffer punishment.
Racial
appeals, which play
on the
dehumanizing stereotypes discussed above, have no
place in our criminal justice system, yet they are
disturbingly routine. See e.g., United States v.
Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir.1996) (holding
prosecutor’s reference to Black defendants as “bad
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people” was a due process violation); United States v.
Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding
prosecutor's statement that “Jamaican[s][are] ...
coming in and they're taking over” and use of “they”
and “them” was prejudicial); McFarland v. Smith,
611 F.2d 414, 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding
prosecutor's statement that Black police officer's
testimony about Black defendant was credible
because it was “someone she knows and that's a
member of her own race” created “a distinct risk of
stirring racially prejudiced attitudes”); Withers v.
United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125-27 (6th Cir. 1979)
(“Not one white witness has been produced in this
case that contradicts [the victim's] position in this
case”); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707
(4th Cir. 1978) (finding prosecutor's statement that
“I argue to you that the average White woman
abhors anything of this type...with a Black man” in
rape case violated due process); Kelly v. Stone, 514
F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding prosecutor asking
jury to “[t]hink about the consequences of letting a
guilty man...go free. Because maybe the next time it
won't be a little Black girl from the other side of the
tracks; maybe it will be somebody that you know”
denied Black defendant a fair trial when taken
together with other inappropriate comments);
United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d
152, 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding Black
defendants were denied fair trial where prosecutor
stated defense counsel's “experience with the people
of the colored race” provided knowledge of “their
weaknesses and inability to do certain things that
maybe are commonplace for the ordinary person to
do.”); State v. Hinton, 43 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1947)
(prosecutor's statement “I do not ask you to convict
the defendants merely because a White man was
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killed by a negro” found to be reversible error).
Conjuring racial animus in jurors serves to detract
from the administration of justice, from the finding
of truth, and from the fairness of a trial.
Prosecutors “may strike hard blows” but they
may “not...strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.” Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 (1935). Because racial
appeals so thoroughly taint the fairness of a trial,
such appeals are just as illegitimate when made by
defense counsel as they are when made by a
prosecutor. See e.g., Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga. App.
279, 280 (1985) (finding error not harmless where
defense counsel stated “Y'all niggers 40 or 50 years
ago would be lynched for something like this, but
you're not under the law guilty of rape because these
people are just as guilty as you are”). Racial appeals
brought by any party inject racial animus into a
process that should be void of bias. Indeed, any
introduction of a racial appeal has an irreversible
impact on the entire proceeding, jeopardizing the
validity of any findings or determinations: there is
no way of discerning whether the result rests on
reasonable inferences made from the evidence or
bias engendered through racial appeals.
C.

This Court Has Routinely Interpreted
Procedural Rules and Bars to Permit
Review of Impermissible Uses of Race

It is “incontestable that the death penalty
inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it
discriminates against him by reason of his race,
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religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the
play of such prejudices.” Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). This Court’s jurisprudence with
respect to procedure has reflected Justice Douglas’
sentiment in Furman. That is, “procedural
rules…are designed to enhance the accuracy of a
conviction or sentence,” Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S.Ct. 718, 730 (2016), and where proceedings
have been infected with racial discrimination,
procedural rules cannot shield such prejudice from
review.
Just last term this Court addressed exclusions
of jurors because of their race and reaffirmed its
unconstitutionality. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S.
____, 136 S.Ct. 737 (2016). Yet such a meritorious
claim may have eluded review were it not for a
favorable finding on subject matter jurisdiction.
While this Court could have found that Georgia’s res
judicata doctrine barred review of the defendant’s
Batson claim, it instead chose to review the merits of
the claim. Id. at 1746–47. Procedure should bend
toward fairness and justice. Nearly 140 years ago in
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), this Court
considered a procedural barrier to reviewing the
merits of habeas petitions from district courts. In
deciding whether this Court had jurisdiction to grant
the writ, the Court held the claims should be
reviewed “in favor of liberty.” Id. at 337. Further, in
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), this Court
found that Georgia’s implementation of procedural
bars to Batson claims was impermissible. In Ford
this Court could well have found Georgia’s
procedural bar consistent with precedent because
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the petitioner’s claim had already been reviewed
under the standards set out in Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965) (overruled on other grounds by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); it instead
rejected application of the bar and remanded the
case for consideration of the merits of the
defendant’s claims. Ford, 498 U.S. at 425.
Similarly, in other contexts, this Court has not
hesitated to reach the merits of claims raising
substantial constitutional questions notwithstanding
the availability of procedural escape hatches. For
example, in NFIB v. Sebelius, this Court held that
review of the challenges to the individual mandate in
the Affordable Care Act was not barred by the AntiInjunction Act. 567 U. S. ____ (2012), 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2582–84, 2593–601 (2012). See also 26 U.S.C. §
7421(a); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000(a), (g)(2). And in Knox v.
SEIU, 567 U. S. ____ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012),
this Court rejected the defendant’s mootness claim
in part based on the proposition that “as long as the
parties have a concrete interest, however small, in
the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.”
Id. at 2288 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S.
435, 442 (1984). Sebelius and Knox demonstrate that
where this Court confronts a profound constitutional
question, whether it involves the impermissible use
of race, or some other constitutional imperative,
precedent and practice allow for review in close
cases. Procedure may bend without breaking.
This Court has ensured review of state court
decisions of federal questions by avoiding state
procedural bars, unless those bars are “strictly or
regularly followed.” Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,
262–65 (1982) (holding state procedural bar
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inadequate and reviewing state court decision
ordering election without compliance with Voting
Rights Act). Where this Court has acknowledged
steep procedural barriers, it has also conceived just
exceptions. For example, federal habeas review of
federal claims is barred where there is an adequate
and independent finding of procedural default on
state law ground, except where failure to review the
claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
Mr. Buck’s case is alive because of this Court’s
acknowledgment of steep procedural bars unjustly
foreclosing review of constitutional violations. This
Court recognized in Martinez v. Ryan that review of
state convictions and sentences are guided by
procedural “rules designed to ensure that state-court
judgments are accorded the finality and respect
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism.” 132
S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). See also Trevino v. Thaler,
133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (extending Martinez to Texas
criminal appeals). Implicit in this principle is that
state sentences must be subject to review where the
integrity of legal proceedings is threatened. There is
no greater corruption of a sentencing proceeding
than an overt claim that the defendant’s race is a
factor that may be considered in assessing a
defendant’s future dangerousness.
Procedural rules are not absolutes; they are
forged in service of principles of fairness, accuracy
and justice. This Court has rightly given way to
substantive law where procedural rules may have
barred such review, particularly where there were
potential impermissible uses of race. This case
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involves a death sentence infected by overt racial
appeals, a finding of future dangerousness tainted by
reference to Mr. Buck’s race. This Court should
properly find these circumstances extraordinary and
worthy of review.
CONCLUSION
For all the aforementioned reasons, the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit should be reversed.
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